The Coalition of the Willing: A Way Forward for IFA Reforms
The Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4) was held in Sevilla (Spain), from June 30 to July 3, 2025, amidst a challenging global economic and geopolitical environment. The FfD4 took place against the backdrop of rising global debt levels, backsliding of developmental goals, escalating geopolitical tensions, weakening of multilateralism and international solidarity, and severe climate shocks.
The FfD4 was the fourth in a series of international conferences convened by the United Nations. Its primary objectives were to close the $4 trillion annual funding gap for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), address the global debt crisis, and push for reforms of the international financial architecture (IFA). The conference was attended by over 15,000 participants, including heads of state, government ministers, and leaders from international financial institutions (IFIs), the private sector, and civil society.
In a major blow to multilateralism, the United States, under the Trump administration, withdrew from the FfD4 process several days prior to the finalization of the text, citing objections to various proposals concerning debt, financial regulation, and the governance of international financial institutions. Despite this significant setback, the remaining 192 UN member countries stayed committed to the FfD4 process, thereby demonstrating that while multilateralism may be fractured, it is not yet dead. This achievement is particularly noteworthy in the current international context, where an increasing number of nations are prioritizing their own national interests and acting unilaterally, rather than engaging in global cooperation to address shared challenges.
Should the U.S. withdrawal from the FfD4 process and potentially other future multilateral initiatives on reforming the IFA be seen as a blessing in disguise, as posited by some observers? Not quite. The reality is that meaningful IFA reforms can only be delivered with the active involvement of the U.S., given its predominant role in the global financial system.
The FfD4 concluded with the adoption of the “Sevilla Commitment” (Compromiso de Sevilla), a global framework that builds upon the legacy of three previous FfD agreements: the Monterrey Consensus (2002), the Doha Declaration (2008), and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (2015).
The Sevilla Commitment entails a series of intergovernmental and multi-stakeholder dialogues, notwithstanding the opposition or hesitance of the United States and several other nations to participate. These dialogues include a “borrowers forum” to help developing countries learn from each other on how to address their sovereign debt concerns, and commitments to hold annual discussions in the UN Economic and Social Council on credit ratings and another on financial integrity to address concerns about illicit financial flows.
Furthermore, a diverse array of countries and institutions have committed to collaborate on over 130 initiatives registered through the Seville Platform for Action (SPA). These initiatives encompass the further operationalization of the G-20 initiative called the Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty, the establishment of an annual Sevilla Forum on Debt spearheaded by the Government of Spain, and the assurance of appropriate financing for social protection, involving the International Labour Organization (ILO) and other entities.
Lack of Systemic IFA Reforms
Although the recommendations outlined in the outcome document are non-binding and rely on voluntary actions, the Sevilla Commitment falls short in proposing much needed systemic reforms necessary to address the underlying problems in the global financial system and its architecture, which contribute to financial instability, perpetuate inequality, and create debt vulnerabilities for the poor and developing countries. In the case of IFA reforms, the FfD4 represented a missed opportunity to facilitate concrete and actionable outcomes aimed at making the global financial system fairer and more inclusive.
Several recommendations for IFA reforms listed in the Sevilla Commitment are not novel. For instance, the proposal to enhance the voice and representation of developing countries within the IMF and World Bank was initially articulated in the Monterrey Consensus in 2002 and has been reiterated subsequently in other high-level forums, including the G-20. However, there is a notable absence of a comprehensive roadmap for the implementation of this proposal. Consequently, the reforms related to voice and representation that have been undertaken thus far remain partial, and significant imbalances persist. Advanced economies, particularly the United States and Europe, continue to exert disproportionate influence within both institutions.
The goodwill embedded in the Sevilla Commitment is commendable; however, it cannot substitute a time-bound commitment and a minimum guarantee to show the global community that progress on the IFA reforms agenda is attainable through coordinated multilateral efforts.
From Monterrey to Sevilla, many FfD observers (including the author) have underscored the imperative to fundamentally reform the current IFA so as to serve the contemporary needs, rather than clinging to economic powers and geopolitical priorities of the previous century. The current international financial architecture, established following the Second World War at the Bretton Woods conference (New Hampshire, U.S.) in 1944, is becoming increasingly anachronous and ineffective in addressing the needs and challenges of the 21st century.[1] In the absence of systemic IFA reforms, the world continues to experience various types of financial crises.[2]
Moving Towards a Post-Hegemonic World
In his 1973 book on the Great Depression, “The World in Depression[3]”, economic historian Charles P. Kindleberger argued that a hegemonic power, or a dominant global leader, is essential for the provision of global public goods such as financial stability, open markets, and crisis management mechanisms, which collectively benefit all nations. In Kindleberger’s words, ‘‘For the world economy to be stabilized, there has to be a stabilizer—one stabilizer’’.[4]
According to Kindleberger, a hegemon provides such goods not solely out of altruistic intentions but because the costs associated with their provision are outweighed by the economic benefits it receives. The hegemon is prepared to assume a disproportionate responsibility for the provision of public goods to address collective action problems associated with public goods. When such a hegemon is either unable or unwilling to provide public goods, the global system becomes susceptible to instability and crises, a phenomenon often referred to as the “Kindleberger Trap”. Kindleberger posited that the economic instability observed during the inter-war period (1918-1939), which ultimately led to the Great Depression, was partially due to the absence of a global leader with a large, dominant economy.
In the decades following World War II, the United States emerged as the preeminent global superpower, shaping international economic and political relations in alignment with its strategic interests. In the 1940s, for instance, the U.S. led the creation of a rule-based global economic order through key initiatives and institutions, including the establishment of the Bretton Woods international monetary system and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)-based multilateral trade regime.
However, the geopolitical landscape of the 2020s differs significantly from that of the 1940s, when Western global power was predominantly concentrated in a single entity. In the contemporary era, other power centers, such as China, the European Union, the BRICS bloc, and various regional actors, have acquired substantial economic and political influence on the international stage.
As its ability to project power and influence across multiple arenas is declining, the U.S. must adjust to a global landscape where it is one among several influential nations contributing to the shaping of the international order. The growing evidence further substantiates the assertion that hegemony is often counterproductive to collective action.
While the United States continues to hold the position of the world’s largest economy, with the U.S. dollar serving as the primary global reserve currency, it has rapidly lost its ability to shape the trajectory of the global economy. In contemporary times, other countries, whether acting independently or in collaboration, are assuming crucial roles in global trade, supply chains, innovation, clean energy, and climate action. Consequently, their influence on the international economic order is becoming increasingly pronounced.
As a result, the global landscape is transitioning into an era characterized by multipolarity. Nevertheless, the establishment of a new international economic order, potentially led by China and other rising powers, which could supplant the existing U.S.-led order, has yet to materialize. In the current scenario, the words of Antonio Gramsci ring true: “The old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.”[5] In any case, the transition from a U.S.-centric to a fragmented, multipolar global economy is unlikely to proceed smoothly due to heightened uncertainly and institutional flux.
World minus one[6]?
Amidst the ongoing geopolitical competition and the U.S. administration’s “America First” policy, which prioritizes national interests over multilateral cooperation, there arises a strategic opportunity for other nations to double down on international cooperation in multiple areas such as finance, trade, climate, biodiversity, and various other cross-border issues where their mutual interests converge.
Given the current reluctance of the United States to engage in multilateral initiatives on IFA reforms, it is imperative that the global community does not remain passive. Indeed, the absence of the United States from FfD4 and potentially other multilateral initiatives on financial reforms allows other major global economies, such as the European Union, China, Brazil, and India, to articulate ambitious and coherent reforms without the need to accommodate constraints imposed by Wall Street and U.S. domestic politics.
Nonetheless, major economic powers should remain receptive to potential future participation by the United States in such initiatives. Why? Because meaningful IFA reforms are unlikely to occur without the active involvement of the U.S. in their implementation, given its dominance in the global financial system. This dominance is bolstered by the widespread use of the U.S. dollar in international finance, its veto power over key decisions in the IMF and World Bank, the influence of Wall Street, and the deep liquidity of American capital markets.
Eventually, the United States must engage with IFA reforms within multilateral forums to safeguard its own economic interests and prosperity. This necessity arises from the financial interconnectedness and global responsibilities that accompany its predominant role in the global financial system. Similarly, the United States requires coordinated international cooperation on other globally interconnected issues, such as climate change, terrorism, infectious diseases, and illegal drug trafficking.
The What, Why, and How of an IFA Reforms Coalition of the Willing
In the current international context of policy shifts and institutional flux, we propose the establishment of a coalition of the willing for IFA reforms. This coalition, primarily led by poor and developing economies, would engage in deeper international cooperation on IFA reforms through targeted initiatives.
Some may question the necessity of establishing an additional grouping on IFA reforms, given the existence of the G-20 and its International Financial Architecture Working Group. Nevertheless, the G-20 is too entrenched in the prevailing hegemonic order, its legitimacy has been widely questioned, and seems incapable to handle future global crises given its sluggish response to the COVID-19 pandemic – in sharp contrast to its earlier efforts following the 2008 global financial crisis.
The rationale underlying our proposal is that poor and developing nations cannot afford to remain passive; therefore, they should assume responsibility for initiating IFA reforms through collective action by forging a coalition of the willing within the multilateral frameworks and institutions.
A coalition can give poor and developing countries a stronger voice within the multilateral institutions and processes as they lack the power to initiate IFA reforms individually. Their collective voice and success could build momentum and exert pressure for a more broader action in the future.
An IFA reforms coalition can enable its members in overcoming individual constraints by sharing the tasks of engaging in technical discussions and substantive policy issues at the UN and other multilateral forums. By pooling resources, members who lack the capacity to monitor and participate in extensive and intricate multilateral negotiations can maintain their involvement in these negotiations, thereby ensuring their positions are better articulated. Enhancing access and participation constitutes a crucial initial step in influencing the outcomes of multilateral negotiations.
As widely observed in the context of the World Trade Organization (discussed later), the process of collective bargaining through coalitions holds the potential to enhance representation and exert influence on the negotiation processes.
In contrast to various international coalitions of the willing, such as the U.S.-led Multi-National Force—Iraq and the Network for Greening the Financial System, which function outside traditional multilateralism and frequently undermine multilateral institutions dependent on collective decision-making—thereby raising concerns regarding their legitimacy, equity, and accountability—our proposal for the IFA reforms coalition of the willing is designed to operate exclusively within multilateral frameworks and institutions, thus contributing to the preservation of multilateralism.
Indeed, our proposal seeks to further strengthen multilateralism and deepen international cooperation in areas where there is a consensus among willing nations. Consequently, the coalition of the willing for IFA reforms will not establish an entirely new and competitive arrangement that could undermine multilateralism. Instead, it will strengthen multilateral forums, such as the United Nations’ Financing for Development, and leverage technical synergies with other multilateral frameworks and institutions, including the 2030 Agenda and Bretton Woods institutions.
Although the prospects of creating an IFA reforms coalition may appear bleak to some, there exist numerous historical precedents of similar coalitions established in the past, and many are still operating within multilateral institutions. The G-77 is a prime example of such coalitions (see Box 1).
Box 1: Reinventing the Group of 77 (G-77) Established in 1964 by 77 developing countries that signed the “Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Developing Countries” issued at the conclusion of the inaugural session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva, the G-77 stands as the largest coalition of developing countries within the United Nations. It serves as a platform for the Global South to promote shared economic interests and strengthen collective bargaining power on all major international economic issues within the UN framework. Despite retaining its original name for historical significance, the G-77 now encompasses over 130 member countries plus China, which, while not a formal member, collaborates closely with the G-77. The Charter of Algiers, adopted by the G-77 in 1967, delineates its institutional framework, which has progressively evolved to include various subgroups. Among these is the G-24, which was formally created in 1972 and now includes 28 member nations, focusing on economic and financial matters. The G-24 subgroup—officially called the Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs and Development—plays a role in coordinating the positions of developing countries on matters related to international monetary and development finance, particularly at its biannual meetings held just prior to the spring and fall meetings of the IMF’s International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) and the World Bank’s joint Development Committee (DC). During the 1970s, the Group of 77 (G-77) was instrumental in advocating for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), which aimed to restructure international economic relations to foster a more equitable global economy. In 1974, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, which outlined non-binding principles rather than establishing a treaty with legally binding obligations. Even efforts to fully implement the NIEO non-binding principles did not succeed because discussions hit a difficult deadlock. This was primarily due to the issue-by-issue approach, rather than a single undertaking, adopted in engaging with the action program. Besides, many G-77 missions were deficient in the expertise and staff necessary to effectively engage in the complex negotiations on individual components of the NIEO. By the early 1980s, a global debt crisis emerged, prompting a shift in the global economic policy agenda towards structural adjustment policies supported by the Bretton Woods institutions, which undermined the NIEO’s principles and goals. Other critical factors that contributed to the failure of the NIEO (as well as weakening of G-77 solidarity) include internal fragmentation within the G-77, stemming from divergent economic interests among its members, such as the divide between OPEC and non-OPEC members on oil price hikes; the rise of neoliberalism; strong opposition from developed countries; and the establishment of the WTO. Even the UNCTAD, born together with G-77 as a negotiating forum to address global economic imbalances, abandoned the NIEO framework in the early 1990s and restructured itself to function as a think tank and provider of technical assistance. Simultaneously, the emergence of mini-lateral clubs, such as the G-7 and G-20, in the global governance landscape also undermined the United Nations platform upon which the G-77 depended to advocate for the NIEO. Owing to the lack of strong institutional support, the G-77 as a group has historically, and continues to, lack regular staff, in-house domain experts, and long-term leadership. The limited resources and capacity available to many G-77 diplomatic missions, which are often staffed with a handful of diplomats, further impede the development of high-level technical analysis. This limitation consequently reduces the ability of the G-77, both collectively and as individual members, to engage meaningfully in technical discussions and substantive policy matters. Without robust technical analysis to formulate coherent policy alternatives to those proposed by the Global North, the G-77’s ability to engage meaningfully on multiple complex matters (ranging from international financial architecture to trade to climate change) has been weakening over the years. This has not only diminished the group’s influence in global negotiations but also rendered its members more vulnerable to external influences. In the realm of intricate global policymaking, technical leverage is essential to capitalize on the G-77’s numerical majority. Due to its large and increasingly economically diverse membership, the G-77 often struggles to develop common positions and coordinated actions in response to pressing global issues at the UN and other multilateral forums. The internal heterogeneity of the G-77 leads to policy disagreements and undermines collective actions, thereby diminishing its leverage in multilateral negotiations. Furthermore, the activities of the G-77 and many of its subgroups frequently appear to be “event-driven”, with their responses, such as communiqués and declarations, being shaped by the schedules of international conferences and meetings. A pertinent example is the G-24’s biannual meetings, which are convened immediately prior to the spring and fall meetings of the IMFC and DC. While an “event-driven” approach enables the G-77 and its various subgroups to address specific issues under discussion at major international meetings, there is a notable absence of continuous initiatives to proactively address new developments and crises as they arise. Despite its institutional and other shortcomings, the solution does not lie in disbanding the G-77 and its various subgroups, but rather in its reinvention and revitalization through the strengthening of its internal structures and processes. The group, both as a collective entity and through its individual members, should enhance its diplomatic and technical capabilities while leveraging its numerical strength to serve as a formidable representative of the developing world within the United Nations and other multilateral institutions. If the G-77 stays cohesive and enhances its internal structures and processes, it has the potential not only to shape but also to propel the momentum for IFA reforms multilaterally.
Myriad Coalitions in the WTO
Many member-countries of the WTO have established several coalitions (also known as negotiating groups) to align their positions and enhance their negotiating power by functioning as a cohesive bloc to promote their shared interests in trade negotiations within the organization.
Although the WTO ostensibly operates on a consensus basis to ensure every member has a voice, poor and developing countries have strategically formed coalitions to enhance their influence and representation within the organization. These coalitions often speak with one voice by assigning a single coordinator or negotiating team, which is subject to regular rotation.
In the WTO, coalitions manifest in diverse forms, each pursuing distinct agendas. Certain coalitions, such as the African Group, address broad issues and are informed by their regional identities. In contrast, others, like the G-33, concentrate on specific issues. Additionally, some groupings, exemplified by the Cairns Group, are crossover coalitions that include both developing and developed country members. Some notable coalitions of poor and developing countries in the WTO include the G-33, also known as the Friends of Special Products, which focuses on agricultural issues, and the G-90, an umbrella coalition encompassing countries from the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), the African Group, and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) Group.
These coalitions, formed on the basis of shared interests in specific issues, have proven effective in enhancing the representation and participation of their members in the decision-making processes of the WTO. Some strong coalitions also had an institutional impact at the WTO.
While it is undeniable that WTO coalitions are not flawless and do not substitute for the absence of formal WTO reforms, some coalitions have nonetheless demonstrated their ability to influence both the agenda and outcomes of trade negotiations. A notable example is the “coalition on TRIPS and Public Health WTO”, which effectively mobilized collective efforts to address the implications of the TRIPS Agreement on public health, particularly in poor and developing countries. Their collective efforts led to the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health in 2001, which affirmed the right of WTO members to implement measures for the protection of public health and clarified flexibilities, such as compulsory licensing.
In order to conceptualize a coalition of the willing countries for IFA reforms, it is crucial to draw lessons from the experiences of the G-77, its various subgroups, and multiple coalitions currently active within the WTO. This will help us to reclaim their successes while avoiding their pitfalls.
Reinvigorating Multilateralism
In addressing the myriad global challenges, from financial instability to climate change, cooperation through multilateral solutions and institutions emerges as the most effective framework for collective action. This approach is contingent upon the implementation of an equitable and balanced strategy to manage shared challenges, ensuring that no single power dominates the process. Concurrently, it is imperative to reconceptualize multilateral frameworks and systems by incorporating humanistic values and prioritizing sustainability as fundamental tenets of international cooperation and solidarity in the 21st century.
Multilateral solutions and platforms represent the most effective strategy for nations with limited bargaining power to exert influence over global decisions. The coalition of willing nations has the potential to significantly balance power asymmetries within multilateral forums. In these settings, powerful countries often exert disproportionate influence, despite the formal equality that is ostensibly maintained.
Despite its limited enforcement capabilities and other imperfections, the United Nations remains an essential platform for poor nations to challenge unilateral actions by dominant powers and uphold their collective norms. Without the UN, poor and weaker states would lack an international forum with equal representation to voice global policy reforms that serve their interests.
Going forward, an IFA reforms coalition of the willing should endeavor to enhance multilateral solutions and establish a rules-based international financial system that primarily benefits poor and developing economies, which lack the economic heft to protect their financial and economic interests.
Way Forward
Forming an IFA reforms coalition of the willing requires a critical mass of countries, initially comprising at least 30 nations, that possess the political will to initiate the process as well as implement IFA reforms. Upon reaching a critical mass, the coalition may extend invitations to other nations, including advanced economies, to participate.
Upon its establishment, the IFA reforms coalition of the willing may form thematic working groups and extend invitations to non-state actors, including subnational entities, civil society organizations, academia, business associations, and labor unions, to participate in policy deliberations, keeping a fine balance between technical expertise and high-level public participation.
In particular, strengthening ties with civil society and think tanks, particularly those from the Global South, would augment its knowledge base and capacity.
Of course, there remain several unresolved questions, such as whether poor and developing countries are interested, in principle, in establishing an IFA reforms coalition of the willing? Which country or consortium of countries might assume leadership in kicking off the process of forming an IFA reforms coalition? Additionally, what will be the modalities, and how will the coalition be structured and institutionalized within existing multilateral and other institutions? How will an IFA reforms coalition interact with the G-77 (including its subgroup G-24) as well as the G-20?
Addressing these lingering questions and other practical considerations should be a priority for all those interested in the idea of creating an IFA reforms coalition of the willing countries. Nonetheless, the ongoing initiatives by Africa, spearheaded by the African Union and the African Group, to push for a United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation (UNFCITC) to create a more inclusive and equitable global tax system present a glimmer of optimism.
Notes and References
[1] For a detailed discussion on the current international financial architecture and its shortcomings, see Kavaljit Singh, “Reimagining and Redesigning International Financial Architecture: The Path to Sevilla and Beyond”, Briefing Paper # 68, Madhyam, June 20, 2025. Available at: https://www.madhyam.org.in/reimagining-and-redesigning-international-financial-architecture-the-path-to-sevilla-and-beyond/.
[3] Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-39, University of California Press, 1973.
[4] Ibid, p. 304.
[5] Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (eds), Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, Lawrence and Wishart, 1971.
[6] This phrase was recently coined by Lee Hsien Loong, Senior Minister of Singapore, to describe a global economic framework that temporarily excludes the United States, in response to unilateral trade policies, such as tariffs, implemented by the Trump administration. It suggests that other countries can engage in collaboration and form new partnerships independently, even if the U.S. is not fully engaged in the existing multilateral system.
The author would like to thank Barry Herman for valuable comments on an earlier draft of this briefing paper.
Kavaljit Singh works with Madhyam.
Image Courtesy of the United Nations